helped to facilitate a surprisingly fluid and orderly process of transition to a postSuharto era.
The remainder of this essay aims to explain such oddities and ironies in the demise of the New Order in terms of the logics of sirkulasi and macet in the workings of the Suharto regime. On the one hand, this essay arguesar, it was the underlying tension between circulation and accumulation in Suharto's New Order which set the stage for the macet total of May 1998. On the other hand the essay suggests, the regime's own tactics for managing macet helped to shape the process and outcome of regime transition. By tracing the logics of sirkulasi and macet, this essay seeks to illuminate the final months of the Suharto era, drawing on the abundant treasures of scholarship on Indonesia's New Order as well as the pedestrian observations of this bystander on the streets of Surabaya and Jakarta during the macet total of 1998.
Logics of Circulation and Accumulation
As Pemberton argued, the Suharto regime was an essentially hybrid form of authoritarian rule, whose internal institutional contradictions provided the essential parameters for political continuity and change in Indonesia since the mid-1960s. Many observers noted the tensions between the regime's 'traditional Javanese' and modernizing tendencies in the ideological realm, its variously integralist and Islamicist approaches to ethnic and religious diversity, and its alternately liberal and statist leanings in economic policy. Yet the most important tensions within the regime, it can be argued, stemmed from the peculiar mix of institutional bases and personal networks through which Suharto entrenched himself in power and exerted authority over the more than thirty years of his rule. In this regard, one key structural tension within the regime developed between the pattern of circulation within the Armed Forces and the process of personal accumulation by the President, between the military circuitries of his regime and the more civilian networks for his electoral and ideological legitimation and his (and his family's) economic enrichment. This tension prefigured the macet to come.
As is well known, Suharto came to power in late 1965 in the wake of a coup d'6tat, and it was his position as commander of Kostrad, the Army Strategic Reserve Command, in Jakarta-and as one of the Army's most senior generals-that allowed him to consolidate power, both within the Armed Forces and in Indonesian society at large. Under Suharto, the Army assumed a dominant role within the Armed Forces, the state, and society, and Army officers (both active and retired) came to occupy numerous key positions as cabinet ministers, local government officials, heads of state enterprises, and members of the regime's pseudo-parliamentary bodies. Institutionally, the Armed Forces' preeminent position within the state was guaranteed through its appointed representatives in the largely rubber-stamp parliament and the MPR, the body that met every five years to "elect" the president and vice-president. 5 Over the years, even as Suharto abandoned his Army uniform for civilian attire and relinquished his long-held role as Defense Minister to successive (retired) generals, the President retained considerable control over military promotions and assignments. However, unlike civilian autocrats such as Ferdinand Marcos in the neighboring Philippines, for example, Suharto was acutely aware of the dangers of overstaying generals and saw fit to maintain a steady pace of rotation (mutasi) and retirement. Every year, officers reaching the ripe age of fifty-five were pensioned off, usually to cushy civilian postings. The fruits of this policy were considerable, breeding not a generation of restive colonels but rather a steady stream of upwardly mobile and amply servile generals.
Yet this pattern of fluid sirkulasi gave rise to three underlying structural problems. By the early 1990s, moreover, as the President entered his twilight years, the (by now middle-aged) Suharto children had through similar methods accumulated enormous wealth and amassed vast business empires which spanned all major sectors of the economy. As foreign investors and bankers flooded into the country, they invariably chose members of the President's family as key partners and borrowers in major industrial, infrastructure, and real-estate projects. In short order, the Suharto children also installed themselves and their minions in top leadership positions in Golkar and, in due course, the Cabinet.10 Unlike their predecessors in these seats of power, they were certain to stay so long as Suharto remained President. Their emergence and entrenchment spelled new restrictions on sirkulasi and portended the onset of macet at the highest levels of New Order authority. Thus, by the 1990s, in contrast with all the other old soldiers who faded away in steady numbers with every passing year, Suharto stood out as the nation's sole overstaying general, pursuing dynastic accumulation rather than regenerasi at the pinnacle of state power. With his mortality and the question of presidential succession growing more urgent with every passing year, increasing pressures for turnover could be sublimated but never fully suppressed. First and most critically, the Suharto regime established intimate, but narrowly economic, linkages with Indonesia's embryonic business class, based not on circulation within the state but rather the private accumulation of capital. Dutch colonial policies had discouraged indigenous entrepreneurship and trade,11 spawned immigrant "Chinese" commercial networks,12 and segregated and stigmatized this ethnic minority as "foreign,"13 thus creating a post-independence business class which was both overwhelmingly ethnic "Chinese" and politically very vulnerable. Playing on fears and resentments drummed up in the anti-communist pogroms of 1965-66, the Suharto regime exaggerated and demonized ethnic-Chinese links to Beijing and imposed draconian social restrictions on the ethnic-Chinese community as a whole.14 Meanwhile, in the business realm, the regime relied heavily on ethnic-Chinese pariah entrepreneurs to oil the rusty cogs of the state machinery and domestic market. between Surabaya and Madura foundered in the face of opposition from local Islamic leaders.48 By the early 1990s, in cities and towns throughout Indonesia, local, popular manifestations of macet were clearly on the rise.
In short, the New Order regime incorporated a diverse set of social elites into its orbit through networks or jaringan. In the case of ethnic-Chinese businessmen, the linkages were based on narrow financial ties, with "pariah" status allowing for capital accumulation but impeding inclusion in the circuitries of state power. For "native" aristocrats like the Javanese priyayi, the logic of central state sirkulasi also imposed a definite ceiling on local family network penetration of the upper echelons of the New Order regime. Instead, the most important path for social networking and regime incorporation was located in the national system of modem tertiary education, in which a small minority of Christians and Westernized PSI-ish Moslems entrenched themselves in the early New Order years, but through which new jaringan of (mostly "modernist") devout Moslems were triumphant late-comers by the late 1980s and early 1990s. Meanwhile, both national and local government officials made clear that the definition of "treason" to the Indonesian nation would be understood in religiously and ethnically colored terms. From its inception, the regime had spoken of a "krisis moneter" (krismon) rather than a "krisis ekonomi," suggesting that both the source of, and the solution to, the crisis lay in the mastery and manipulation of currency markets. In early February 1998, moreover, following a meeting with Suharto, the governmentcreated Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Religious Scholars' Council) called for a jihad (holy war) against "speculators and hoarders," defined broadly enough to cover the thousands of-mostly ethnic Chinese shopkeepers, merchants, and businessmen scattered across the archipelago.80
This pattern of jaringan-based incorporation into the power circuitries of the
In cities and towns in Java and various other parts of the country, newspapers were soon awash with reports of local police and military officials investigating and punishing suspected "hoarders."81 However this new crime was defined, it was clear, shopkeepers and merchants were now burdened with new "protection costs" on top of previous exactions and the rapidly rising cost of goods. In addition, as the falling rupiah and resultant inflation sent prices of essential commodities rocketing upwards, local authorities, from bupatis (regents) to regional military commanders, began to requisition amounts of the so-called "nine basic goods" for sale at specially organized distribution centers called pasar murah.82 Many local Islamic groups soon launched parallel efforts, encouraging hopes about the possible role of pesantren and madrasah as distribution centers to replace the much disparaged "Chinese"-owned shops and marketing networks.83 In short, a wide variety of government statements and more concrete actions in the course of January and early February 1998 worked to create an atmosphere of public, officially-sanctioned suspicion and resentment not only towards national konglomerat like Sofyan Wanandi but also the thousands of ethnic-Chinese shopkeepers, merchants and businessmen scattered throughout the Indonesian archipelago. These steps were taken in a country whose government and majority population had long stigmatized the ethnic-Chinese minority as foreign and predatory, and shown considerable sympathy for heavy restraints on the unfettered operation of the so-called free market. These moves were made at a time when the most dramatic and broadly felt effects of the crisis-rapidly rising prices-were first being experienced directly via Chineseowned shops and stores throughout the country. Small wonder that many Indonesians thus saw local ethnic-Chinese shopkeepers as profiting, rather than suffering, from the crisis, as perpetrators rather than victims of the conspiracies and crimes referred to by Suharto and his minions. With newspaper articles reporting almost daily about police and military riot-simulation exercises in various parts of the country, the stage was set for macet diversion and disruption.
Indeed, against this inauspicious backdrop, the months of January and February 1998 saw a series of small-scale riots take place in a number of towns and cities around Indonesia, including Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, Lombok, and Flores. In virtually all cases, the riots took the form of attacks on Chinese-owned shops or department stores, with looting and destruction of goods.84 In many cases, Catholic or Protestant churches were also targeted by the rioting crowds, leaving dozens of Christian houses of worship damaged, burned down, or entirely destroyed by mid-February according to one estimate at the time.85 Reports that some riots were started by outsiders who arrived in trucks or motorcycle convoys led some local and foreign journalists to conclude that many of these incidents had in fact been staged by elements within the regime.86
While the riots did not lead to any mass killings or spread much beyond ephemeral, local episodes, they understandably helped to create (or at least exacerbate) a climate of growing fear and uncertainty. Small-town ethnic-Chinese shopkeepers closed their shops and maintained an especially low profile (even during the traditionally cacaphonous Chinese New Year), while many of their wealthier counterparts in the big cities reportedly purchased open airplane tickets for Singapore or Hong Kong.
Meanwhile, the dramatic and in some instances exaggerated coverage that the riots received in foreign media led to growing international worries regarding "social unrest" in Indonesia.87 Foreign governments issued statements of concern, dispatched 84 Indonesian newspapers and magazines featured hundreds of articles about the riots in January and 
May 1998: Macet Total
Yet such diversions and disruptions in the streets only delayed and deepened the process of macet total. The attacks on Sofyan Wanandi and CSIS, and on "hoarders and speculators" more broadly, could not but contribute to the circumstances which kept local and foreign businessmen alike from making new investments and other longoverdue decisions. The dynamics set in motion by these measures, moreover, including the riots, likewise further weakened the stability and value of the rupiah in January and February, increasing the already enormous and unsustainable levels of foreign debt owed by local companies and the Indonesian government itself. Thus the new agreement signed with the IMF in mid-April 1998, while supposedly more "flexible" than the mid-January deal, was based on much more pessimistic forecasts: higher debt levels, higher inflation, and negative economic growth (-4 percent) for the year rather than stagnation. The impact of these dramatically downward trends was now all too evident in rising unemployment, costs of living, scarcities, and hardships for millions of Indonesians. IMF disbursement of funds, moreover, was now conditional on monthly assessments of Indonesian progress on economic "reform. That evening, as the long lines for fuel and the ensuing traffic jams in the streets of Jakarta and Surabaya suggested, macet total was at hand. Student protests swelled and spilled into the streets in several major cities, demonstrators stopped traffic for hours outside the regional assembly in Surabaya, and Medan erupted in rallies and rioting.100
With President Suharto out of the country to attend an international conference in Cairo, and rumors circulating of a cabinet reshuffle (or special MPR session) on his return, macet clogged the streets. Student protests continued to grow, and confrontations with police and military authorities became more frequent and more heated. The time for a major traffic diversion and street-clearing operation had arrived. In the late afternoon of May 12, after hours of protests in and around Jakarta's elite Trisakti University, security forces opened fire and shot dead six students, wounding many more.101 The killings, suspected to be the premeditated handiwork of military elements led by Lt. Gen. Prabowo, generated widespread public outrage.102 On May 13, thousands joined a burial ceremony for the slain students, bringing crowds to the streets. Scattered rioting and looting ensued in several parts of Jakarta and other cities, most notably Solo,103 continued and spread on May 14, and finally petered out the next day.104
The riots were unprecedented in their scope, violence, and impact. Subsequent reports estimated that more than one thousand people had lost their lives, many others had suffered beatings, rapes, and other indignities, and countless shops, homes, and other forms of private property had been lost to burning, looting, and wreckage.105 While many of those who died were protesters or looters killed by security forces and/or trapped inside burning buildings, it was the ethnic-Chinese Jakarta residents who were targeted for violent abuse at the hands of the rioters. Ethnic-Chinese were victimized in countless incidents, most notably the raping of more than one hundred women in various parts of Jakarta-acts of violence and brutality unseen in previous riots. 106 
